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Abstract—Providing vehicles with extended connectivity in-
troduces new opportunities for services, and also security ap-
plications such as misbehavior detection. However, for many
applications, personal data needs to be processed by the system
providers, which impairs the privacy of the vehicle users. While
focusing our research on new possibilities of connected car
security, we follow privacy by design principles. We explore the
utilisation of various privacy-enhancing technologies (PET) in
order to provide advanced connected car applications, while
preserving the personal data of the vehicle users. Specifically,
we aim to develop practical schemes that utilise Searchable
Encryption to provide a framework for secure and privacy-
preserving connected car applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Connected cars are a growing topic for car manufactur-
ers. Most automotive brands now offer services that provide
control or information querying of vehicles via web interface
or smart phone app. As soon as a specific vehicle is paired
with a user account, the owner can use services such as the
localisation of his car, querying information like travelled
distance or gas usage, and even remote control some functions
such as heating or unlocking and locking doors.
As the trend of connected cars leads to more and more
data about vehicles being saved and processed in back end
systems, the security of theses systems needs to be considered.
Additional connectivity and services may increase the attack
surface of modern vehicles, but it also increases the potential
for detection and prevention of misbehavior and malfunction.
Thus, our research focuses on new methods to utilize con-
nected car data in order to perform misbehavior detection and
security event management on a fleet-bases.
While security monitoring systems for connected cars are a
promising approach, it also raises the question of user privacy.
For such a security system, large amounts of personal data
need to be processed. A personal vehicle often accompanies its
users wherever these travel, thereby collecting large amounts
of information on their whereabouts, behaviour, and possibly
even lifestyle.
Research has shown that having access to specific car
data allows adversaries to deduce further information, such
as identifying behaviour or the identity of the corresponding
individuals.
Thus, the privacy of car users requires protection. The users’
trust in a provider or vendor should not be violated. Further,
even when the manufacturer shows only good intentions, data
should also be secure when it is leaked due to circumstances
such as hacking attacks on the provider back end. Moreover,
legal subpoenas that require businesses to hand over their
users’ data, as well as other attempts to access private data
such as surveillance programs, unsettle customers. The usage
of a vehicle often accurately reflects its owners’ behavior, and
thus the generated data needs to be protected.
II. USER PRIVACY THROUGH SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION
Searchable Encryption (SE) [1] is a promising technology
in an approach to provide fine-grained access control for en-
crypted data. The idea of SE is to enable search algorithms to
work on ciphertexts without the need of prior decryption, and
without even the need to have knowledge of the corresponding
secret key.
A. Searchable Encryption
Generally, two approaches for SE schemes exist. One
approach is to use a specialised encryption scheme that
allows the ciphertext to be searched directly (e.g. Song et
al. [2]). Index-based schemes, however, have better search
performance and allow for arbitrary encryption ciphers. Thus,
we focus on the latter approach.
While the client (the entity that generates and encrypts the
data) is always able to access his data, he can also generate a
so-called trapdoor to enable another party to perform a search
on the encrypted index. The trapdoor is bound to the specific
keyword that it was created for. Thus, the client can limit
access to particular data.
In general, a SE scheme consists of the following four
algorithms:
• KC(λ): This algorithm is run by the client C, takes a
security parameter λ as input, and outputs a secret key
KC .
• I(KC , D): This algorithm is run by the client C, takes
a key KC and data items D as input, and outputs an
encrypted index I , which allows to search D for specific
keywords (using a trapdoor).
• Ts(KC , s): This algorithm is run by the client C, takes
a key KC and a search keyword s as input, and outputs
a trapdoor Ts.
• X(Ts, I): This algorithm takes a trapdoor Ts for search
keyword s and an encrypted index I as input, and outputs
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the query result X . This might be a handle to the
(encrypted) data entry or the data item itself
In the vehicular context, data that is generated and collected
within a vehicle should be sent to and stored on e.g. a back end
server or shared with third-party providers. In order to protect
it from unauthorized access, all data is encrypted before it
leaves the car. Using SE, the user may generate trapdoors that
allows the back end provider to access specific data, and thus
to process it without breaching the users’ privacy. Similarly,
SE can be utilised to manage access for several parties, thereby
allowing third-party services.
Depending on the use case scenario, the server requires
more or less access to data. In some cases it might suffice
to learn whether a given keyword is present in the ciphertext.
Often, however, additional knowledge is required. Different
SE schemes can provide further access. Schemes that allow
for range queries can be used for data that is within certain
limits [3], and decryptable SE can even give the trapdoor-
holder the ability to access the plaintext of the search result [4].
B. Application Scenarios
Many applications could benefit from the privacy protection
that can be achieved with SE, while at the same time being
able to function normally.
Pay-as-you-drive insurance policies (PAYD) are a recent
trend that bases the costs of an insurance policy on driving
behavior. It has the potential to be a fairer alternative to
traditional blanket coverage, but introduces severe privacy
issues. SE could be used to ensure that only necessary data is
accessed. E.g. range queries could be employed to determine
whether acceleration regularly exceeds a certain threshold, or
the vehicle is driven at night time.
Connected car services and the security of connected ve-
hicles are our primary interest for the application of SE.
Similarly to the PAYD scenario, other services could be limited
to their required data with SE schemes. We are specifically
interested in determining whether SE can be used to enable
a back-end-located misbehavior detection that is privacy-
preserving.
C. Discussion
For applications within connected vehicles other crypto-
graphic primitives could be thought of, that might be applica-
ble to the presented use cases. This raises the question whether
SE is better suited.
Secure multi-party computation has the goal to let several
parties compute functions, while keeping their respective input
data private [5]. While this is fitting for the envisioned use
cases, it would require frequent collaboration of the vehicle
with the back end servers. This is impractical for vehicles in
deployment. The back end needs to handle potentially large
amounts of data quickly. It thus cannot rely on communication
with all the vehicles, which might not even be reachable all
the time.
Functional Encryption (FE) is a related technique that can
be used to perform computations on encrypted data and gain
access to the computed result in cleartext without requiring
the secret key to the ciphertext [6]. However, most implemen-
tations of FE only achieve low performance. SE is currently
superior in this regard.
While SE is relatively efficient in regard to computing com-
plexity, it has several limitations. It remains to be evaluated
whether it applies to all of our use cases, and whether it
is flexible enough to be used in the automotive context that
constantly progresses and introduces new applications.
III. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We proposed the application of Searchable Encryption (SE)
in order to provide fine-grained access control to vehicular
data of connected cars. Due to its good performance, it is
suited to provide privacy protection even in scenarios where
large amounts of data are processed. In addition to merely
identifying present keywords in a ciphertext, SE can also
provide further access to the encrypted data—such as ranges
of numeric values, or even the cleartext of search results.
Future work will consist of the identification of the required
data processing capabilities, and whether SE can be applied
to the given scenarios. We are specifically interested in per-
forming misbehavior detection over an entire fleet in the back
end.
In addition to the assessment of suitable schemes, we are
planning to implement a novel protocol for privacy-preserving
data sharing using SE in the automotive context. A subsequent
evaluation of the system is expected to provide us with insights
on its usability, applicability and performance.
The eventual goal is to provide a framework that allows
for data sharing with strong privacy protection for different
applications.
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